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Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) based on wearable devices are being used in a growing variety of applications, many of themwith
strict privacy requirements:medical, surveillance, e-Health, and so forth. Since private data is being shared (physiologicalmeasures,
medical records, etc.), implementing security mechanisms in these networks has become a major challenge. The objective of
deploying a trustworthy domain is achieving a nonspecific security mechanism that can be used in a plethora of network topologies
and with heterogeneous application requirements. Another very important challenge is resilience. In fact, if a stand-alone and self-
configuring WSN is required, an autosetup mechanism is necessary in order to maintain an acceptable level of service in the face
of security issues or faulty hardware. This paper presents SensoTrust, a novel security model for WSN based on the definition of
trustworthy domains, which is adaptable to a wide range of applications and scenarios where services are published as a way to
distribute the acquired data. Security domains can be deployed as an add-on service to merge with any service already deployed,
obtaining a new secured service.
1. Introduction
The utilization of wearable sensors to obtain useful human
body parameters is nowadays a reality, partially due to the
deployment of wireless sensor networks (WSNs) as the back-
bone of the new e-Health applications. A WSN is a network
composed of small autonomous devices (sensor nodes or
motes) that either incorporates sensors or includes the ability
to incorporate them, providing capabilities for monitoring
both individually and cooperatively physical or environmen-
tal conditions (such as temperature, light, or motion) in
each of the possible locations of every node [1]. Some fields
of application for these networks include environmental
control, industrial control, automotive, medicine, defense
and security industries, home automation, and so forth.
Miniaturization enhancements provide a new generation of
tiny sensors that can be embedded in wearable devices to
provide helpful data for a wide range of applications.
A project to deploy a wireless sensor network must
be able to deal with the challenges related to the intrinsic
characteristics of these types of networks. One of the most
important challenges is energy consumption.Wearable nodes
operate autonomously (and are usually battery powered), so
it is necessary for the processes and algorithms used to be
efficient and have an energy-saving focus. Related to this,
the aggregation of information through the network can
be an interesting mechanism: some repeated data are not
taken into account and not sent and, in this way, energy
and resources are saved. Another challenge is the existence
of different types of devices and platforms: there is no
standardization in this kind of sensors nodes so it is desirable
to abstract the hardware features by means of high-level
abstract functions. This can be done with an intermediate
level, called middleware [2].
Since these networks are being used in a wide variety
of applications, security challenges must be addressed too.
For example, in e-Health environments where biometric data
and medical records are being shared, different national and
international privacy laws are applied. As far asWSN security
specific problems are concerned, we have concluded that
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security in WSNs must support generic applications and
the basic operation of the network, taking into account the
following facts:
(i) these nodes are tiny devices,
(ii) they are energy- and resource-constrained regarding
computational power, the amount of memory, radio
bandwidth, and coverage,
(iii) there are no tamper-proof zones in the commercial
hardware platforms to store sensitive information
(passwords, keys, identifications, etc.),
(iv) due to exposure to adverse environmental conditions
they tend to fail or lose their power and may be
removed by unauthorized personnel,
(v) radio communications can be intercepted and cryp-
toanalyzed to extract data, keys, and so forth.
As a wireless system, security challenges are greater than in
wired networks because of the open access to data trans-
missions. By using broadcast transmissions, other devices
listening in the same frequency may intercept every commu-
nication between two nodes. Another WSN challenge is the
possibility of a node being captured and cryptoanalyzed by a
third party. If security keys, policies, and other cryptographic
elements are accessed, a new spurious node could be intro-
duced in the network, and several attacks can be deployed:
denial-of-service, man-in-the-middle, data sniffing and/or
data modification, routes spoofing, and so forth.
This paper is divided as follows. In Section 1 we introduce
the emerging uses of wireless sensor networks, their net-
work topology, node composition, and the challenges when
working with them.This section also includes security issues
addressed in these networks. In Section 2 a series of works
related with security in WSNs is presented; additionally,
the contribution of SensoTrust is described and compared
to those proposals that already exist. The benefits when
developing security protocols specific forWSNs are explained
in Section 3. This section also includes how to deploy trust
domains in wireless sensor networks. In Sections 4 and 5
it is presented how SensoTrust can be applied to e-Health
scenarios and applications, as well as the validation processes
in a real application. Section 6 includes the conclusions and
future work to develop from this paper on.
2. Related Works
The very first proposal for securing emerging WSNs was a
set of security protocols based on TinyOs, called SPINS [3].
SPINS provides data confidentiality, integrity, and authenti-
cation. TinySec [4] also provides the same security mecha-
nisms; both proposals are based on symmetric cryptography
without any key management system. Another example on
specific TinyOs proposals is TinyKey [5] addressed with key
management and included mechanisms for key generation,
distribution, and rekeying.
A novel key predistribution scheme in WSNs is put
forward by Subash and Divya [6]. As it can be guessed, key
distribution is the main concept here.Their proposal is based
on setting two links and two keys for each communication
between two nodes. If one of the communication links is
compromised, the other link is still available. The drawbacks
are the great number of keys involved and the problems that
may be faced when a node is captured (and thus all the keys
contained are revealed). Our proposal reduces the number of
keys needed and performs a rekeying process when a node is
compromised.
SecFleck [7] proposes a platform-specific security add-
on, based on an Atmel TPM (trusted platform module) chip.
Although this solution provides a fast and energy efficient
way to support both symmetric and public key cryptography
(including a tamper-proof chip for storing keys), it is a
platform-specific solution, since it has been designed and
validated only in Fleck nodes. SensoTrust is a platform-
independent solution and can be deployed either as a stand-
alone or composed service. Furthermore, a large number
of proposals have been published involving authentication
schemas. In [8] Khan and Zhang put forward an authen-
tication schema based on smart cards and fingerprints. In
addition to that, Yoon et al. [9] perform the cryptanalysis of
an authentication scheme.
A general overview of trust systems and a simulation-
based study is presented in [10], where Karthik et al. select
five trust models and evaluate them using TRMSim. Results
present BTRM WSN as the best-case trust model.
TRMSim-WSN [11] is a Java-based trust and reputation
model simulator aimed at providing an easy way to test a trust
and/or reputation model over WSNs, along with comparing
it against other models. Another trust calculation schema is
presented by Karthik and Dhulipala in [12].
The first idea of a decentralized trust system was pre-
sented by Blaze et al. [13]. They proposed policymaker, a
unified decentralized trust management system based on a
simple language for describing security policies, credentials,
and relationships.
A trust system for WSNs is presented by Boukerch et
al. in [14]. They provide an agent-based trust and reputation
management scheme (ATRM) for wireless sensor networks,
assuming thatmobile agents are resilient against the unautho-
rized analysis and modification of their computation logic.
In [15], Oleshchuk demonstrates how the concept of
trust can be used to increase security in wireless sensor
networks without using cryptography. It is done so by taking
into consideration trustworthiness of individual sensors and
monitoring each sensor activities. Plus, Dhulipala et al.
present a specific WSN trust system in [16].
A particular trusted routing protocol for MANETS is
presented in [17]. Abusalah et al. propose a trust-aware
routing protocol (TARP) for secure-trusted routing inmobile
ad hoc networks. In TARP, security is inherently built into
the routing protocol where each node evaluates the trust level
of its neighbors based on a set of attributes and determines
the route taking into account these attributes. Recently, there
have been several contributions to trust routing inWSNs [18–
22].
SensoTrust, as described in the following sections, is a
trustworthy domains model used to deploy security services
in a WSN. It includes not only a complete trusting scheme to
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accept, control, and exclude nodes participating in a trusted
domain, but alsomechanisms to define security policies using
symmetric and asymmetric cryptography. Considering the
WSN nodes constrains, security schemas have been designed
to reduce the cryptographic material stored in each node.
It also minimizes the data loss suffered when one of the
nodes is compromised. In order to achieve the resilience
goal, mechanisms for reconfiguring a compromised trusted
domain (with rekeying or server reassignment) have been
defined. These mechanisms are important for applications
with two severe requirements: data security and quality of
service.
3. Deploying Trust Domains
to Increase WSN Security
As WSNs are being widely used in many applications (some
of them with severe requisites such as critical infrastructures
monitoring, defense, surveillance, and e-Health), including
security mechanisms is of major importance. Due to node
limited capabilities, traditional network security schemas are
not suitable, so new schemas must be designed.
Privacy is an important feature to care about. If WSNs
are utilized to share private data (medical records in hospital
monitoring, timetables in access control, location in tracking
systems, etc.), some mechanisms must be implemented to
protect private information from unauthorized access.
Access control is also an important mechanism. In order
to protect data in the network, some control steps must be
applied to give access only to authorized nodes. To gain
access, nodes must be authenticated inside the network.
Finally, if we want to ensure that the data received by
a node has not been modified in the route taken from the
sender, an integrity control mechanism is necessary.
All of these mechanisms can be addressed in a trust-
worthy domains environment, where any new node joining
the network must authenticate itself to obtain the necessary
keys to start sending and receiving data. When nodes are
interconnected, several surveillance policies must be applied
in order to exclude a suspicious node from the network,
preventing the node from participating in it anymore. The
aim of deploying a trust domain is achieving a platform-
agnostic security mechanism that can be used regardless
of network topology or application requirements. Resilience
is a very important concern too. In fact, if a stand-alone
and self-configuring WSN is needed, an autosetup and a
reconfiguring mechanism are required as well, so as to
maintain an acceptable level of service in the face of security
issues.
3.1. TrustDefinitionandTrustDomains. Trust implies reliance
on another person or entity. In the field of knowledge related
to common networks, trust can be determined by the reliance
that each one of the nodes has on the others. Thus, it is very
important to measure this feature in some kind of way. In
WSN, trust increases its importance. Since it is very easy to
introduce a new node in a deployed WSN and capture and
analyze the data traffic, somemechanismsmust be developed
in order tomeasure and assure that all the nodes participating
in a WSN can rely on each other. In our proposal, several
mechanisms are included: trust domains, polling systems,
and measures to undertake when trust has been lost in
a domain. Overall, steps are needed in order to have a
functional trustworthy mechanism.
The first step is trust establishment: a new node partici-
pating in the network must publish its authorization to start
communications with other nodes. Once the new node has
been granted access, trust is propagated through the network.
3.2. Validating Trust Domains and Polling System. When a
trust domain has been defined, and all the elements needed
have been deployed (keys, roles, policies, etc.), nodes are able
to start registering services and sending data. Validation of
the trust domain must ensure that all the nodes participating
in each domain can reach other nodes and have obtained both
the keys and the security policies. Trust must be measured
in some way to determine if one trusted node has been
compromised or has an unexpected behavior (in case a
retrusting mechanism has to be started). In our proposal,
trust is measured by a polling system.
Once the domain has been validated, and the trust in
that domain can be assured, the network will start its usual
working. As an expandable network, new nodes can be
inserted within the ecosystem to extend the range or the
services offered by the network itself.
The way to assure that new nodes behavior does not
compromise the prior trust level is bywatching the newnodes
actions and comparing them with the policies defined. If we
distribute this surveillance system across the network, each
node can report to the head-node (broker, security manager,
or cluster head node) the actions taken by the other nodes. In
this way, compromising the network due to new nodes, or a
trusted node that changes its behavior to a risky one, can be
avoided.
The polling system is simple and effective: each node
assigns votes for every neighbor in its range. In a WSN, each
node can promiscuously read the data sent by its neighbors,
because communications are broadcasted. Data sent means
messages are being generated by each node. If these messages
do not match the rules defined in the security policy, a
negative vote is emitted. The security manager should count
votes for each node, and if the negative result exceeds a
predefined threshold for a node, some actionsmight be taken:
waiting for predefined time (quarantine), excluding the node
from the network, redefining a new trust domain, and so
forth.
3.3. Actions to Take When Losing Trust in a Domain. When
one of the nodes participating in a trust domain becomes
compromised, the whole domain should be treated as com-
promised. Several actions must be taken in order to reestab-
lish the trust in that domain. If the compromise affects a
regular node, it is enough to renew the key that protects com-
munications within that domain and then redistribute the
new key to all the nodes in the domain but the compromised
one. If the compromised node is the domain server (or cluster
head or broker, as previously named), it will be also necessary
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to designate a newdomain server and, right afterwards, renew
the key.
In the next sections the deploymentmodel to evaluate our
proposal will be described, including all the mechanisms to
define, evaluate, and redefine a trust domain.
4. Description of the SensoTrust Proposal
In previous paragraphs we have proposed mechanisms to
define security domains and establish trust inWSNs. In order
to address all the characteristics from the proposal, we have
also designed an implementation model to deal with all the
security issues regarding security domains. SensoTrust (the
proposed model based on previous section directions) is
composed by several elements, which are presented below.
The security manager (SM) is the principal actor of the
model and should be an external host able to generate
symmetric and asymmetric keys in a secure manner. Several
nodes (N) sharing the same domain key (DK) and some
common aspects (mission, localization, capabilities, etc.)
define a trust domain (TD). Each TD has a trust policy (TP),
including the behaviors,measures, actions, and other features
regarding the life-cycle of a trust domain. Also, a domain key
server (DKS) exists in each TD. It is a special node in charge of
distributing the domain key when needed. A single node can
act as a DKS if the security manager decides it. Any node in
the network has its own node ID (NID), unique identification,
and an individual node key (NK).The cipheringmethods and
key sizes used when ciphering a message are defined inside
the ciphering suite (CS). Two types of keys are used in public
key infrastructure (PKI) cryptography: public key (Kp), the
part of the key assumed to be freely distributed, and Private
Key (Ks), the part of the key to be kept in secret and not
distributed.
Since WSN nodes have several limitations, a full and
robust public key infrastructure is unlikely to fit in these
nodes. Due to this reason, a hybrid PKI and symmetric
keys schema has been used in this proposal. PKI is used
for the communication between special nodes (security
manager and domain key server), and a simple-but-secure
AES symmetric key for the plain nodes. The size of this AES
key is constricted by the nodes computing power and, in
order to have a scalable architecture, it becomes defined by
a ciphering suite field in the ciphered data packets, so as to
determine the length of the key or select a new algorithm
(such as RC5, etc.).
4.1. Example Scenario for an e-Health Application. In the
previous section, SensoTrust elements were presented. As
a way to describe in depth the role performed by each of
them, the SensoTrust schema has been illustrated with an
application example: a medical environment with sensitive
data interchange (medical records, biometric parameters of
the patients, medical stuff accessing privileges, etc.). This
application example deployment is shown in Figure 1.
In this basic example, only two trust domains have been
defined (as there are two levels of security): a trust domain
for the admission area and another trust domain for a
postsurgery room. At the admission area, the information
circulating is related to each patientmedical records and extra
information (contact information, personal id, etc.). In this
trust domain, the security policy must guarantee, at least,
information privacy.
At the postsurgery area the information in the network is
composed ofmedical records and real-time biometric param-
eters (body temperature, blood pressure, ECG, breathing rate,
etc.). In this trust domain, not only privacy but also data
integrity must be assured. Furthermore, routing and data
delivery are important when an alarm is issued (e.g., with a
low breathing rate). In the next paragraphs, each SensoTrust
element is identified and described.
The security manager is an external entity (but connected
through the sink to the WSN), where high level security
mechanisms have been deployed. The tasks assigned to the
security manager include node key generation and distri-
bution, security policies definition and distribution, domain
key server role assignment, rekeying processes, and data
recording (with regards to the nodes participating in each
trust domain).
Trust domains definition can be done following several
policies: the number of nodes per domain, node localization,
domains for specific functionalities (e.g., temperature mea-
surement, intrusion detection, environmental monitoring,
etc.), or any other distribution demanded by a specific
application.
Focusing on a generic trust domain (illustrated in Figure 2),
the main components and elements will be described.
For each trust domain defined, a domain key server is
assigned (either in deployment or runtime) and a domain key
is shared. Any node participating in a domain can assume the
DKS role if the former DKS has been compromised. If the
compromise only affects a regular node, a rekeyingmethod is
enough: DKS requests SM a new DK, and then this new key
is sent to all nodes but the compromised using each node key.
Domain key server stores its own pair of public and secret
keys (along with the public key of the security manager, so as
to communicate with it) and the domain key to communicate
with nodes participating in the domain and the security
policy for the domain.
The other nodes also need to keep some important
information: the node ID and key, the domain Key, the public
key of the security manager (used if security manager assigns
the role of the former domain key server to a new node),
and also the domain security policy, where the surveillance
parameters and polling system are described.
Cryptographic information shared by nodes has been
reduced to a minimum in order to minimize the risk when
a node is compromised. In our schema, if a single node or a
DKS is compromised, only the domain key becomes evident
(as the public key of the SM can be revealed without security
issues). Redistributing a new DK or designating a new DKS
will be enough to recover the trust.
4.2. Federation of Critical Nodes in the Network for Resilience
Improvement. There are some special nodes inWSNs that are
of critical importance for the satisfactory performance of the
network. Depending on the network topology, these special
nodes can be named as cluster heads, relays, brokers, and so
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Figure 1: Proposed model applied in medical environments for an e-Health application.
forth. An efficient solution is implementing a mechanism to
replace one of these nodes if they get compromised or stop
working properly (due to low battery, falling out of coverage,
etc.) as a method to improve the resilience of the network.
A good example of this solution is broker federation. In
a network with some nodes acting as brokers to deploy and
publish the services, should the broker be compromised, the
applications are not able to access sensor data anymore. The
solution to this issue is reassigning the role of “broker” to
another node.This reassignment is based on node reputation
(using the polling system), node battery status, or node
capabilities. From this moment on, the new broker will
publish all the services to the applications and the network
will work properly again. SensoTrust includes this possibility,
since the domain key server can be considered as the broker
or the cluster head, and DKS reassignment mechanism has
been developed in our proposal. When a new node starts
acting as a DKS/cluster head/broker, the former one can be
suspended if it is considered as a spurious node.The complete
process is presented in the next section.
4.3. Sequence Diagrams for Processes. Several messages have
been defined to model the communication between the
elements of the system. There are messages to join a domain
(HELLO), renew the domain key, query and send a node key,
assign a new domain key server when the active one has been
compromised, and renew the compromised keys. In next
paragraphs, sequence diagrams describing thesemessages are
presented.
The first step that a new node has to complete when
entering a WSN is joining a defined trust domain. A HELLO
message is sent by the new node (Node1 in Figure 3). Data in
thismessage includes a randomnumber (𝑥) cipheredwith the
node key (only DKSs having that key will be able to decipher
it), the ciphering suite used, and its unique node ID. This
message is broadcasted to one (or several) active domain key
servers, and the DKSs will prompt the security manager for
the Node1 key (using node ID received as an index) to be able
to cipher and decipher data to/from Node1.
The SM will decide which one of the querying DKS
will be answered (the SD where the new node should join).
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The DKS designed will receive the Node1 key and will use it
to cipher the data included in the HELLO REPLY message.
These ciphered data include the random number sent by
Node1 (in order to confirm to Node1 that the responding
DKS is a trusted one) and the key for domain participation.
Additionally, the Node ID is added.
When Node1 receives the HELLO REPLYmessage, it will
use its own Node key to decipher it obtaining: the random
number (𝑥) previously sent in the HELLOmessage (checking
that the replying DKS is a trusted one, since it has been able
to decipher the HELLOmessage) and the domain key for the
trust domain assigned.
At this point, Node1 has access granted to trust domain 1,
since it has obtained domain 1 key and is able, for example, to
publish its services to the network (cipheredwith theDomain
1 Key) and then they get published by a service orchestrator
or broker existing in the WSN.
Another interesting process is the ability of the system
to renew a domain key that has been compromised (e.g.,
if a node is captured and cryptoanalyzed). This process,
described in Figure 4, starts with a DKRenew message sent
by the DKS to the SM containing the compromised key
(ciphered with the SM public key—Kp—guaranteeing than
just the SM will be able to open it), ciphering suite used,
and DKS1 identification.The SMwill respond with a message
containing the new domain key (ciphered with DKS1 public
key), ciphering suite used, and DKS1 identification. In order
to reobtain Domain 1 trust, the new domain key must be
sent to all the nodes but the compromised one. A DKRenew
message is used, which contains the new DK ciphered with
the individual node keys (one message per node).
The worst case is when the compromised node is the
domain key server (which can also be named as the cluster
head or the broker as presented in Section 4.2). The security
manager will choose a new node to assign the role of DKS.
This election can be done using several variables, defined
in the security policy: node reputation (using the polling
system), node battery status, node capabilities, and so forth.
This process starts, as described in Figure 5, with a
DKS ASSIGN message using double ciphering. First, all the
Table 1: Security requirements and solutions.
Requirement Solution
Authentication Node ID, PKI
Availability Node revocation
Privacy Keys, PKI
Data integrity Hash
Prot. outsider attacks Node ID, PKI
Prot. insider attacks Security policies, trust domains
cryptographic information needed by new DKS to start
working is added: the new domain key, a public/private key
pair for this newDKS, and a random number (𝑥).This data is
ciphered using the SM secret key. Then, another ciphering is
donewith the newDKS symmetric key.This double ciphering
guarantees two aspects: the only node able to decipher the
message will be the new DKS (since it is ciphered with its
symmetric key) and this newDKSwill be able to confirm that
the message was generated by the trusted SM, using the SM
public key to decipher the message previously signed by the
SM.
SM needs confirmation from the new DKS, so a reply
message is sent. Again, a double ciphering is used. First, the
random number (𝑥) sent by the SM is ciphered with the
DKS secret key, and then the message is ciphered with the
SM public key, guaranteeing that just the SM will be able to
decipher the message and will confirm that it was generated
by the assigned DKS and not by a spurious one.
Once the new DKS is assigned and confirmed, the new
domain key will be sent to all the nodes but the compromised
DKS, as described in Figure 4 (domain key renewal).
4.4. Security Analysis. The presented proposal is able to pro-
vide solutions to cover a wide range of security requirements.
They fulfill the majority of the security requirements for
WSNs-based applications, from the less critical ones (animal
control, trafficdensitymeasurement, or environmentalmoni-
toring) to themost security-sensitive requirements needed by
e-Health applications, which demand data integrity, privacy,
authentication, and so forth. For each security requirement
identified, a solution has been included in SensoTrust, as
depicted in Table 1.
Furthermore, the security proposal has been evaluated
against a well-known group of security attacks selected from
the literature [23, 24]. For each attack, the countermeasure
implemented in SensoTrust proposal is described as follows.
(i) Denial of service (DoS): this is the least sophisticated
attack. It appears when either the physical layer
is degraded to a level where the communication
between nodes is impossible (jamming) or when a
spurious node starts sending malicious data packets
to the network. In both situations, an alarm is trig-
gered in the SensoTrust security manager to alert the
IT-security staff.
(ii) Sybil attack occurs when a node is asking for multiple
IDs. If the attack succeeds, the node is able to subvert
the trust mechanism. In SensoTrust, every node ID
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Node1 DKS1 SM
O/B
Hello (NK1∗[x], CS, N1Id)
Hello Rp (NK1∗[DK1, x], CS, N1Id)
GetNodeKey (KpSM∗[N1Id], CS, DKS1)
NodeKeyRp (KpDKS1∗[NK1], CS, DKS1)
Services (DK1∗[services])
Figure 3: Sequence diagram describing a new node registration into a trust domain.
SM DKS1 Node n
Applies to all the nodes
in the domain but
the compromised one
GetNodeKey (KpSM∗[N1Id], CS, DKS1)
NodeKeyRp (KpDKS1∗[NK1], CS, DKS1)
DKRenew (NKn ∗ [DKnew])
DKRenew (KpSM∗[DKold], CS, DKS1)
DKRenewRP (KpDKS1∗[DKnew], CS, DKS1)
Figure 4: Sequence diagram describing how the security manager starts the renovation of a domain key.
is preconfigured for each node and only the security
manager (out of the WSN) has the complete list of
the IDs. Furthermore, it is possible to perform a node
revocation (as explained in the previous section).
(iii) Message corruption: in this attack, a message reaches
the recipient with a different content than the one
sent by the source. This situation is either because
the message has been degraded in the transmission,
or because the message has been intercepted and
intentionally changed. To avoid both issues, Sen-
soTrust includes the ciphering suite functionality,
which allows performing amessage hash (usingMD5,
SHA1, etc.).
(iv) Eavesdropping:WSNs use broadcast transmissions, so
other devices listening in the same frequency may
intercept every communication between two nodes.
To avoid data disclosure, SensoTrust provides both
symmetric and PKI ciphering capabilities.
(v) Node subversion: if one of the nodes is captured and
cryptoanalyzed the secret keys, node ID, security
policies, and so forth are disclosed. SensoTrust aim
is to minimize the cryptographic and security infor-
mation stored in each node. Nevertheless, if a node is
captured, all the keys in the network can be renewed
as explained in previous section.
(vi) Node replication occurs when a node ID is copied,
replicated in a new node, and then introduced in
the network. From that moment on, the network
accepts the node with the cloned ID as an authorized
node. SensoTrust provides two mechanisms to avoid
this attack. The first one is the Node ID, which is
stored in an external entity (the security manager)
that controls all the IDs working in the network. The
second mechanism is security policy. If the security
manager detects that 2 nodes are operating with the
same ID, a node revocation protocol is issued, and the
node is dropped from the network.
(vii) False node: this attack introduces data traffic in the
network to avoid legitimate nodes to communicate
(injecting false data messages, claiming for autho-
rization continuously, etc.). Using the node ID, Sen-
soTrust is able to identify the false node and, using the
domain key renewal functionality, all the messages
sent by this node will be discarded.
Attacks and countermeasures have been summarized in
Table 2.
5. SensoTrust Validation in
a Real Application: Results
We needed to validate our security proposal against a com-
plete, deployed platform in an e-Health scenario, so it was
8 International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks
SM
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process
Node n (new DKS)
DKS AssignRP(KpSM∗[KsDKSn ∗ [x]], CS, DKSn)
DKSAssign(NKn ∗ [ KsSM∗[KpDKSn, KsDKSn, DKnew, x]], CS, NIdn)
Figure 5: Sequence diagram describing how the security manager designates a new domain key server.
Table 2: Attacks and countermeasures.
Attack Countermeasure
DoS SM alarm
Sybil attack Node ID, node revocation
Message corruption Hash
Eavesdropping Keys (symmetric and PKI)
Node subversion Few crypto. data stored
Node replication Node ID, security policies
False node Node ID, domain Keys
decided to use the one developed for the project “AWARE:
Accessible Wearable Device Platform for Smart Environ-
ments,” as the research group the authors work on is involved
in the development of this project. The main goal of AWARE
is to define a ubiquitous and accessible platform for the
deployment of services in intelligent environments through
the use of wearable devices. One of the deployments is
based on the extension of the middleware developed within
the LifeWear project [25]. LifeWear intends to improve the
quality of human life by using wearable equipment and
applications for everyday use.Themain objective of LifeWear
is the development of modern physiological monitoring
to inspect human health status in different environments,
so that actions and safety critical issues will be real-time
monitored. This means, for example, that blood pressure,
pulse, or body temperature of a patient can be tracked with
wearable devices and sent to the medical staff at a fast pace to
control the correct fulfillment of a treatment. It is also possible
to use mobile technology to build computer-based online
services for people, such as virtual training environments, or
monitor workers in hostile work environments that demand
a high state of alertness, such as firemen. This means that
wearable-enabled online monitoring of human bodily states
has a wide range of application possibilities, as long as the
related issues can be solved.
One of these related problems is security. Since medical
parameters are sent (blood pressure, temperature, pulse, etc.),
data privacy is a must. A security mechanism to provide
data confidentially and integrity can be deployed with our
proposal (SensoTrust), integrated in the system as a new
service that can be combined with already deployed ones.
Middleware
Hardware abstraction layer
Cross-layer 
services
Service composition
Applications
Security
service
High level services
Low level services
Brokering
service
Service Service Service
Service Service
Service
Wireless sensor network
Figure 6: AWARE platform, including LifeWear’s middleware and
security component.
The AWARE architecture, including the middleware pro-
posed in LifeWear, is displayed in Figure 6.Themiddleware is
composed by four abstraction layers, regarding the function-
alities covered in each of them, namely, hardware abstraction
layer, low and high services, cross layer services, and service
composition platform.
The hardware abstraction layer includes the sensor node
hardware platform, the operating system, and the networking
stack. It offers an easy way to port the solution to other
hardware platforms.
The low and high services layers define the software
components needed to abstract the underlying network
heterogeneity, thus providing an integrated, distributed envi-
ronment to simplify the programming tasks by means of a
set of generic services, along with an access point to the
management functions of the sensor network services.
The upper layer is the service composition platform,
designed to build applications using services offered by the
lower layers.
The cross-layer services are offered to both high and low
level services in order to provide inner service composition.
The security systempresented in this paper has been deployed
as a service inside this layer. The security service can be used
by the upper layer (service composition) to compose new
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Figure 7: Energy consumption per process.
Table 3: Delay introduced by the security service.
Process Time (ms)
New node authentication 739
New service publication 525
secured services, based on the services presented in the lower
layers.
The architecture has been deployed over a commercial
WSN node solution: SunSpot platform, manufactured by
Oracle. Main characteristics of SunSpot hardware (rev. 6)
platform are as follows:
(i) processor: ARM 920T CPU (180MHz-32 bit),
(ii) memory: 512 Kb RAM, 4Mb FLASH
(iii) network: Chipcon 2420 radio with integrated antenna
(IEEE 802.15.4 at 2.4GHz),
(iv) Data: USB interface—mini-b connector,
(v) power supply: 3.6 V rechargeable 750mAh Li-Ion
battery.
As mentioned above, a new security service has been
deployed over this platform, and several tests were carried out
to obtain data about the behavior of the system. Since our
proposal only requires cryptography calculation when it is
needed, energy efficiency is assured. Onlymessages of critical
importance will be ciphered, reducing power consumption
in a large number of processes that do not require it. Energy
consumption of different processes is shown in Figure 7.
Delay introduced by the system is also another important
parameter to measure. Delay introduced by the security
service is shown in Table 3. Two basic operations have been
measured: the authentication of a new node in the network
and the publication of a new service when a node has been
already authenticated (including ciphering delay).
6. Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, a trustworthy domains model (SensoTrust)
to deploy security services in a WSN has been presented.
Furthermore, we have proposed a complete trusting scheme
to accept, control, and exclude nodes participating in a
trusted domain, defining security policies, and using sym-
metric and PKI cryptography and special elements to achieve
that goal (security manager and domain key servers). Also,
resilience issues have been addressed, proposingmechanisms
to reconfigure a compromised trusted domain with rekey-
ing or servers reassignment. Security schemas have been
designed to reduce the cryptographic material stored in each
node in order to minimize the data loss suffered when one of
the nodes is compromised. The proposal has been tested and
validated in a real e-Health application: the AWARE project.
An open issue is checking the influence of our system as
for power consumption (battery life) in a wide range of WSN
commercial solutions. Several benchmarking tests should be
performed to obtain measures and comparatives.
Finally, testing our proposal in different applications and
scenarios will give us important data aboutmodifications and
new security schemas.
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